QUOTE(GlassBeadGame @ Fri 21st May 2010, 12:21am)
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Seems inconsistent to treat a website like a ISP for the purposes of immunity but then say they don't have "customers" so they are not subject to the filtering disclosure. Putting (d) into Sec 230 would seem to argue that those person downstream of a "provider of an interactive computer service" are the "customers" referred to here.
Interactive computer services simply aren't ISPs. I think this is true from the plain broad meaning of the language, but it's especially true as interpreted. The term is a sort of catch-all.
"any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server"Is Wikipedia an information service, system, or access software provider? Yes.
Does it enable computer access by multiple users? Yes.
To a computer server? Yes.
This is the analysis in Sec. 230 cases. Amazon, eBay, Craigslist, Myspace--all of these have been found to be "interactive computer services."
That established, it's more than a little counter-intuitive to say that a server "enters into an agreement" with a passive browser. New user accounts seems more like an agreement (even with Wikipedia's lack of TOS), but I suspect that this is an academic question because "a manner deemed appropriate by the provider" is a pretty toothless requirement. There are literally no published orders about this, although plenty of non-ISP sites have been protected by sec. 230.
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Could One explain further about state tax liability? I didn't follow that point.
No problem. Subsection (d) was added to this section later--this is why early Sec. 230 decisions like
Zeran refer to 230(d)(3) and so forth--that subsection is now at 230(e)(3).
I think its important to evaluate this subsection in context of statues passed contemporaneously--COPA and Internet Tax Freedom Act of 1998.
The amendment for subsection (d) is actually part of COPA--section 1404. For this reason, maybe (d) is a dead letter to begin with, for the apparent unconstitutionality of at least part of COPA. However, like you I suspect that such a requirement would not be unconstitutional.
ITFA was passed within weeks of COPA at 112 Stat. 2681-719. The purpose of this bill was to forbid states from levying new taxes on internet access for three years. However, it provided a sort of ludicrous exception for parties that distribute harmful materials to minors (apparently they can be taxed(!?)), but then it says that ISPs are not excepted or covered by the moratorium on taxes "unless, at the time of entering into an agreement with a customer for the provision of Internet access services, such provider offers such customer (either for a fee or at no charge) screening software that is designed to permit the customer to limit access to material on the Internet that is harmful to minors."
This section uses different terms (and has vastly different definitions for those terms) than Sec. 230, but it's interesting to me that it contemplates "entering into an agreement" to "provision" services, as in Sec. 230. In this statute, they're clearly thinking about ISPs.
I interpret 230(d) as referring to ISPs, although 230's "safe harbor" immunity covers all "interactive computer services." I think it's most natural to interpret ISPs as the particular kind of "interactive computer service" that makes agreements to "provision" service.
All that said, this is obviously original research on my part. Before yesterday, I did not realize Sec. 230(d) was a subsequent addition.