QUOTE(dtobias @ Sat 18th April 2009, 3:55pm)
QUOTE(Peter Damian @ Sat 18th April 2009, 10:47am)
and they were undeniably awful, or would that be Awbrey-full in Awbrey-speak.
No, to produce fully native Awbrey-speak, you'd have to include some Greek letters and mathematical symbols, as well as a few pointless "e-" prefixes.
That would be Awbr-e-full, then?
QUOTE(Jon Awbrey @ Sat 18th April 2009, 3:54pm)
We've been through this before. We watched you regress to the level of a Hypo-Critical Wikipediot Twit, and it was not a pretty sight. Please spare yourself the e-barassment.
E-barassment, that's very funny! how does this joke work? Any word with an 'e' in it, and you isolate the letter with a hyphen or two. Why actually is this funny? Is it meant to be? Or is it providing us with some insight? What is that?
Meanwhile I found the edits in question, to the Peirce article, link is here
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=...&oldid=59059034To my mind this is very bad writing - verbose, pompous, ungrammatical in places. This, e.g.
QUOTE
And so we are required, as so often happens in trying to read a writer of another age, to lift the scales of the years from our eyes, to drop the reticles that have encrusted themselves on our 'reading glasses', our hermeneutic scopes, due to the interpolant philosophical schemata that have managed to enscounce themselves in our unthinking culture over the years that separate us from the writer in question.
[edit] I forget this:
QUOTE
When we start to hear these abstract, general, uninterpreted symbols being described as 'meaningless' symbols, then we can be sure that a certain line in our sand-reckoning has been crossed, and that the crossers thereof have hefted or sublimated 'formalism' to the status of a full-blown Weltanschauung rather than a simple heuristic device.
The whole section is here:
QUOTE
Formal perspective
Peirce did not live or work in a vacuum. No one who appreciates his use of phrases like laws of the symbol in their historical context can fail to hear the echoes of George Boole, nor the undertones of the symbolist movement in mathematics that was inspired by the ideas of George Peacock.
At the outset of his Laws of Thought, Boole tells us how he plans to evade the horns of a dilemma that would otherwise threaten to block his inquiry before he can even begin.
In proceeding to these inquiries, it will not be necessary to enter into the discussion of that famous question of the schools, whether Language is to be regarded as an essential instrument of reasoning, or whether, on the other hand, it is possible for us to reason without its aid. I suppose this question to be beside the design of the present treatise, for the following reason, viz., that it is the business of Science to investigate laws; and that, whether we regard signs as the representatives of things and of their relations, or as the representatives of the conceptions and operations of the human intellect, in studying the laws of signs, we are in effect studying the manifested laws of reasoning. (Boole, Laws of Thought, p. 24)
Boole is saying that the business of science, to investigate laws, applies itself to the laws of signs at such a level of abstraction that its results are the same no matter whether it finds those laws embodied in objects or in intellects. In short, he does not have to choose one or the other in order to begin. This simple idea is the essence of the formal approach in mathematics, and it is one of the reasons that contemporary mathematicians tend to consider structures that are isomorphic to one another as tantamount to being the same thing. Peirce avails himself of this same depth of perspective for much the same reason. It allows him to investigate the forms of triadic sign relations that exist among objects, signs, and interpretants without being blocked by the impossible task of acquiring knowledge of supposedly unknowable things in themselves, whether outward objects or the contents of other minds. Like Aristotle and Boole before him, Peirce replaces these impossible problems with the practical problem of inquiring into the sign relations that exist among commonly accessible objects and publicly accessible signs.
How often do we think of the thing in algebra? When we use the symbol of multiplication we do not even think out the conception of multiplication, we think merely of the laws of that symbol, which coincide with the laws of the conception, and what is more to the purpose, coincide with the laws of multiplication in the object. Now, I ask, how is it that anything can be done with a symbol, without reflecting upon the conception, much less imagining the object that belongs to it? It is simply because the symbol has acquired a nature, which may be described thus, that when it is brought before the mind certain principles of its use — whether reflected on or not — by association immediately regulate the action of the mind; and these may be regarded as laws of the symbol itself which it cannot as a symbol transgress. ("On the Logic of Science" (1865), CE 1, 173).
The motive themes of the symbolist movement are familiar to anyone who has worked a "story problem" in a mathematics course. One learns to approach the story problem, a roughly realistic representation of a concrete set of circumstances, with the aim of abstracting the appropriate general formula from the mass of concrete details that make up the problem — not all of which data are equally pertinent to the solution and some of which may even be thrown in as distractors. The next step is to derive the logical implications of the abstract formula, generally speaking substituting specific values for some of its variables but just as often leaving other variables unfilled in. The bearing of the formula on the desired answer is obscure at first — that is what makes the problem a problem in the first place. But progressive clarification of the formula leads to an equivalent or implied formula that amounts to an abstract answer or a generic solution to the story problem. Given that, there is nothing more to do but fill in the rest of the concrete data to arrive at the concrete answer or the specific solution to the problem.
The three-phase maneuver for solving a story problem, (1) teasing out, (2) cranking the crank, (3) plugging in, can be articulated in semiotic or sign-relational terms as follows: The first phase passes from the object domain to the sign domain, the second phase passes from the sign domain to the interpretant sign domain, continuing perhaps in a relay of successive passes, and the third phase passes from the last interpretant sign domain back to the object domain.
There are a number of issues that typically arise with the continuing development of a symbolist perspective, in any field of endeavor, over the years of its natural life-cycle. We can see these issues illustrated clearly enough in our story problem paradigm, with its parsing of the problem-solving process into the three phases of abstraction, transformation, and application.
Once the division of labor among the three phases of the process has been in place for a sufficiently long time, each of the three phases will tend to take on a certain degree of independence, sometimes actual and sometimes merely apparent, from the other two phases.
As a side-effect of the increasing independence among the various phases of inquiry, there tend to develop specialized disciplines, each devoted to a single aspect of the initially interactive and integral process. A symptom of this stage of development is that references to the 'independence' of the several phases of inquiry may become confused with or even replaced by assertions of their 'autonomy' from one another.
Returning to the formal sciences of logic and mathematics and focusing on the rise of symbolic logic in particular, all of the above issues were clearly recognized and widely discussed among the movers and shakers of the symbolist movement, with especial mention of George Boole, Augustus De Morgan, Benjamin Peirce, and Charles Peirce.
The first symptoms of a crisis typically arise in connection with questions about the status of the abstract symbols that are 'manipulated' in the transformation phase, to express it in sign-relational terms, the sign-to-sign aspect of semiosis. In the beginning, while it is still evident to everyone concerned that these symbols are mined from the matrix of their usual interpretations, which are generally more diverse than unique, these abstracted symbols are commonly referred to as 'uninterpreted symbols', the sense being that they are transiently detached from their interpretations simply for the sake of extra facility in processing the more general thrust of their meanings, after which intermediary process they will have their concrete meanings restored.
When we start to hear these abstract, general, uninterpreted symbols being described as 'meaningless' symbols, then we can be sure that a certain line in our sand-reckoning has been crossed, and that the crossers thereof have hefted or sublimated 'formalism' to the status of a full-blown Weltanschauung rather than a simple heuristic device.
What we observe here is a familiar form of cyclic process, with the crest of excess followed by the slough of despond. The inflationary boom that raises 'formalism' beyond its formative sphere as one among a host of equally useful heuristic tricks to the status of a totalizing worldview leads perforce to the deflationary bust that makes of 'formalist' a pejorative term.
The point of the foregoing discussion is this, that one of the main difficulties that we have in understanding what the whole complex of words rooted in 'form' meant to Peirce is that we find ourselves, historically speaking, on opposite sides of this cycle of ideas from him.
And so we are required, as so often happens in trying to read a writer of another age, to lift the scales of the years from our eyes, to drop the reticles that have encrusted themselves on our 'reading glasses', our hermeneutic scopes, due to the interpolant philosophical schemata that have managed to enscounce themselves in our unthinking culture over the years that separate us from the writer in question.